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CORPORATIONS - OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS - DUTY TO INVESTIGATE
PURCHASERS OF CONTROLLING INTEREST - Plaintiff corporation, an investment trust specializing in shares of small life insurance companies, brought an
action against its former officers and directors, referred to as "the management
group," who in 1937 owned twenty-seven per cent of the outstanding stock
of the corporation. This group sold all their stock at an inflated price to another
group, referred to as "the Boston group," who on the resignation of the management group immediately elected themselves to the control of the corporation.
By this control the Boston group obtained access to the portfolio and proceeded
systematically to rob the corporation of all its securities. At the time the stock
was sold the management group had some inkling of the purposes of the Boston
group. No investigation of the purchasers was made, though the vendors were
warned of their possible liability. The court assumed the situation should have
awakened the suspicion of prudent men, and adequate facilities to make an
investigation were available. Held, under these circumstances the transaction
must be treated as a sale of the control of the corporation, not a mere sale of its
stock; and as the vendors of that control had not made a reasonably adequate
investigation of the purchasers, though put on guard, they must be liable for the
harm that resulted to the corporation. lnsuranshares Corporation of Delaware v.
Northern Fiscal Corp., (D. C. Pa. 1940) 35 F. Supp. 22.
The directors and officers of a corporation, having control of its assets and
affairs and possessing the ability to inflict great harm upon it, occupy a fiduciary
position.1 As regards third persons they are treated as agents of the corporation,
but as to the corporation itself equity holds them liable as trustees, though they
are not such in a technical sense.2 It is this fiduciary duty which requires the
officers and directors to investigate the motives of those who seek to purchase

1 Gochenour v. George & Francis Ball Foundation, (D. C. Ind. 1940) 35 F.
Supp. 508; Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N. Y. 157, 61 N. E. 163 (1901).
2 55 L. R. A. 751 (1902); 13 AM. JuR. 948 (1938); 14A C. J. 97 (1921).
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the control of the corporation.3 An outright sale of an official position in the
corporation is a definite breach of trust by the directors and officers 4 as is similarly the sale of positions on the board of directors, 5 even though the sale may
ostensibly be a sale of shares of stock in the corporation. For these breaches
of trust there must be an accounting to the corporation.6 Removal from office
will ordinarily terminate this fiduciary duty and the former officers and directors
can deal with the corporation as strangers,7 but if an act was started while they
were in office its completion is still regarded as their act. 8 Also, a conspiracy to
rob the corporation will give a continuing liability to officers and directors of
such a nature that they will be required to account for the malfeasance of their
successors.9 However, there is nothing unlawful in officers and directors dealing
in the securities of their corporation. 10 As individuals, they have the same right
to sell their shares as have all other stockholders.11 They may even make an
additional profit from the sale of their shares 12 but it must not be made at the
expense of the corporation. 13 The important thing is that they make a bona
fide sale of stock. Where the owners of the control of the corporation are seeking
indiscriminately the highest selling price for their shares as a block, completely
3 Field v. Western Life Indemnity Co., (C. C. 111. 1908) 166 F. 607; and principal case.
4 Field v. Western Life Indemnity Co., (C. C. 111. 1908) 166 F. 607, affd.
Moulton v. Field, (C. C. A. 7th, 1910) 179 F. 673.
5 McClure v. Law, 161 N. Y. 78, 55 N. E. 388 (1899); Heineman v. Marshall,
II] Mo. App. 546, 92 S. W. II31 (1905); Oil Shares v. Kahn, (C. C. A. 3d, 1938)
94 F. (2d) 751, reversed on other grounds, sub nom. Oil Shares v. Commercial Trust
Co., 304 U.S. 551, 58 S. Ct. 1059 (1938).
6
Some cases hold that the officer-vendor has only to account for the amount of
the purchase price he received. Field v. Western Life Indemnity Co., (C. C. Ill. 1908)
166 F. 607; McClure v. Law, 161 N. Y. 78, 55 N. E. 388 (1899); Heineman v.
Marshall, II] Mo. App. 546, 92 S. W. II31 (1905). But there is authority that he is
liable for the full extent of the injuries caused to the corporation by his successors.
Oil Shares v. Kahn, (C. C. A. 3d, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 751; Moulton v. Field, (C. C. A.
7th, 1910) 179 F. 673; and see principal case.
7
Holmested v. Annable, (Saskatchewan, 1914) 18 Dom. L. R. 3.
8
Hooker, Corser & Mitchell Co. v. Hooker, 88 Vt. 335, 92 A. 443 (1914).
9
As part of a preconceived plan the officers and directors replaced themselves with
the actual malfeasors. Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N. Y. 157, 61 N. E. 163 (1901).
10 Miles v. Aqua Pura Co., 208 Ky. 816, 271 S. W. I IOI (1925); Seitz v. Frey,
152 Minn. 170, 188 N. W. 266 (1922). Some authorities require in the purchase of
stock of a corporation that a director disclose any facts affecting the value of the stock,
though others feel that the officer is a fiduciary only to the corporation and not to the
stockholders. Cf. Seitz v. Frey, supra.
11 13 AM. JuR. 966 (1938); 19 C. J. S. 171 (1940); Trisconi v. Winship,
43 La. Ann. 45, 9 So. 29 (1891); Insurance Agency Co. v. Blossom, (Mo. App. 1921)
231 S. W. 636; Donaldson v. Anderson, 300 Pa. 312, 150 A. 616 (1930).
12
Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 91 A. 428 (1914); Stanton v. Schenck, 142
Misc. 406, 252 N. Y. S. 172 (1931).
13
Stanton v. Schenck, 142 Misc. 406, 252 N. Y. S. 172 (1931). It is also felt
that a director cannot make an additional secret profit from the sale of his stock
where he is selling all the stock of the corporation as a complete sale of the corporation.
Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 91 A. 428 (1914).
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disregarding the character of the purchasers and their means of payment, there
is a strong indication that a sale of control rather than a sale of stock is contemplated.14 Immediate resignation by the vendors from the office of directors,
with succession by the purchasers, following the sale of shares is further indicative of such a sale of control. 15 Both these factors were present in the principal case, so it was to be expected that the court would deem the transaction a
sale of control giving rise to a fiduciary duty to investigate the designs of the
purchasers. Since the duty was breached when no investigation was made, the
vendors are liable for the losses caused by the acts of the purchasers. The apparent willingness of the former officers and directors to permit their successors a
free hand with the corporate assets might further be treated in the nature of a
conspiracy to rob the corporation. This theory gives additional support to the
decision of the principal case that the corporation could recover from the former
officers and directors to the full extent of the malfeasance of their successors.16

See principal case.
McClure\!'· Law, 161 N. Y. 78, 55 N. E. 388 (1899); Heineman v. Marshall,
II7 Mo. App. 546, 92 S. W. u31 (1905).
16 See note 6, supra.
14
15

